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4. International law in domestic courts
David L. Sloss and Michael P. Van Alstine
1. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
The central premise of this volume is that the relationship of law and
politics in international law varies depending on the sites where the
relationship unfolds. In this chapter, we analyze that premise in the
creation, interpretation, recognition, implementation and modification of
international norms in domestic courts. We will explain, however, that
beyond these ‘stages of governance,’ a decisive factor in explaining the
engagement of domestic courts with international law is the nature of
the legal rule at issue. Specifically, our analysis demonstrates that the
willingness of domestic courts to view an international issue as one of
law, not politics, varies in important ways depending on whether they are
being asked to apply a horizontal (state-to-state) rule, a vertical (state-to-
private party) rule, or a transnational (private-to-private) rule.
1.1 The ‘Judicialization’ of International Law
In their origin, composition, and institutional competence, domestic
courts are legal institutions. Their stock in trade is the identification and
application of norms of a legal, not political, nature. It is nonetheless
widely accepted that courts are political actors as well. Political scientists
have explained convincingly that courts (especially supreme courts) do
not long adhere to policies ‘substantially at odds with the rest of the
political elite’.1 Domestic courts are constituted by, and more generally a
product of, their home polity. As a result, it is quite unlikely that they
ever could be fully insulated from the cultural, social and political
environments in which they function. The relative influence of law and
politics in the work of domestic judicial bodies thus is of intense
scholarly interest.
1 Robert A. Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker’ (1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 291.
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All of this plays out in international law as well. Indeed, in recent
years scholars have demonstrated convincingly the increasing signifi-
cance of domestic courts in this realm, not only as legal actors but also as
agents in the development of international norms.2 Enthusiasts have
championed the ‘globalization of judicial power.’3 Some, such as Anne-
Marie Slaughter, have highlighted the purely political aspects of ‘judicial
globalization’.4 The focus for these scholars is on the means by which
judges participate in cross-border dialogue as autonomous political
actors.5
Scholars have emphasized as well the growing influence of domestic
courts in their formal institutional function – that is, in the application of
international legal norms in disputes properly before them. As a prelimin-
ary matter, however, one must distinguish in this regard between coun-
tries that have an independent judiciary and those that do not. Roughly
one-third of the countries in the world lack an independent judiciary.6 In
those countries, politics (that is, the subjective, situational desires of
those in power) may trump law as a routine matter. In order to analyze
the relationship between law and politics in domestic courts in any
productive sense, therefore, this chapter focuses on countries with an
independent judiciary.
2 See, e.g., André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule
of Law (Oxford University Press 2011).
3 See Neal Tate and Torbjom Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of
Judicial Power (NYU Press 1995).
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal
of International Law 1103, 1112–23.
5 See, e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communi-
cation’ in Thomas M. Franck and Gregory H Fox (eds), International Law
Decisions in National Courts (Transnational Publishers 1996) 37; see also Osnat
Grady Schwartz, ‘Changing the Rules of the (International) Game: How Inter-
national Law is Turning National Courts into International Political Actors’
(2015) 24 Washington International Law Journal 99, 101, 129–34.
6 The Polity IV Project is the best source of data for estimating the number
of countries with independent judiciaries. See Polity IV Project, ‘Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2014’, accessed 12 September
2016 at www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. The ‘exconst’ variable ranks
countries on a scale from 1 to 7, measuring the degree of external constraints on
the executive branch. A score of ‘1’ means that there are no significant
constraints on executive power; a score of ‘7’ indicates substantial constraints. In
the 2014 data, 109 out of 167 rated countries received a score of ‘5’ or better on
the ‘exconst’ variable. This is a reasonably good proxy for determining whether
a country has an independent judiciary.
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In countries with an independent judiciary, the clear trend in recent
decades has been the ‘judicialization’7 or ‘legalization’8 of international
relations. This phenomenon has expanded the field in which claimants
may resort to legal argumentation, not political contestation, in inter-
national and transnational disputes. Moreover, recent decades have wit-
nessed an extraordinary increase in the ‘density’ of international law. It
now covers large swaths of the legal landscape, from commercial law to
environmental law, family law and human rights law (among myriad
others). The ultimate effect of such ‘judicialization’ is to ‘shift … the
balance of power between law and politics [to] favor judicial institutions
over representative and accountable institutions’.9
The primary question domestic courts must confront, however, is
whether any particular norm has passed from the realm of politics to law.
As Kenneth Abbott et al. have explained,10 ‘legalization’ of an inter-
national norm involves three essential attributes, each of which is ‘a
matter of degree and gradation’: (1) ‘obligation’ – the extent to which the
norm is legally binding on a state or other actor; (2) ‘precision’ – the
extent to which the norm unambiguously defines the required, authorized
or proscribed conduct;11 and (3) ‘delegation’ – the extent to which third
party institutions (especially domestic courts, independent agencies and
international courts) have authority ‘to implement, interpret, and apply
the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules’.12
7 See Ran Hirschl, ‘The New Constitution and the Judicialization of
Politics Worldwide’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 721, 723–4; Martin Shapiro
and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford University
Press 2002); Schwartz (n 5) 129–34.
8 See generally Judith L. Goldstein and others, Legalization and World
Politics (MIT Press 2001).
9 Russell A. Miller, ‘Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of ‘Pure
Politics’ in the United States and Germany’ (2004) 61 Washington & Lee Law
Review 587, 590.
10 See, e.g. Kenneth W. Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’
(2000) 54 International Organization 401, 401–4.
11 Franck describes a norm with this attribute as one that is ‘determinate’.
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University
Press 1990) 41–9. Koskenniemi captures the notion with the term ‘concreteness’.
Marrti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European
Journal of International Law 4, 7–19.
12 Sandholtz and Sweet describe this phenomenon as a continuum founded
on the extent to which rules are ‘formal, precise, and authoritative’ and are ‘tied
to organizational supports, including enforcement mechanisms’. Wayne Sand-
holtz and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Law, Politics, and International Governance’ in
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In broad terms, one may describe the differing attitudes of domestic
courts toward international law based on their tendency to adopt either
‘harmonization techniques’ or ‘avoidance techniques’.13 The former term
covers a wide variety of practices domestic courts employ to give effect
to international norms in their domestic legal systems. The latter term
describes a range of contrasting techniques some domestic courts
have devised ‘to by{pass otherwise … applicable international legal
provisions’.14
The most potent ‘harmonization technique’ is a decision by a domestic
court that a particular international norm is binding as formal law in the
domestic legal system. But some courts also have given effect to
international norms that do not formally qualify as domestic law. In this
vein, courts have given effect to unincorporated treaties, applied inter-
pretive presumptions to ensure conformity of domestic statutes with
international law, and even relied on international norms in constitutional
interpretation. Courts inclined to special ‘friendliness’15 to international
law also have found fertile ground for the development of domestic law
in existing (and even developing) rules of customary international law.
When, in contrast, courts resort to ‘avoidance techniques’ they relegate
claims founded in international law to politics or diplomacy.16 For
example, some courts have recognized a ‘political question’ doctrine for
issues with particularly important or sensitive foreign policy impli-
cations.17 A narrow conception of ‘standing’ in the assertion by private
parties of rights founded in international law may severely circumscribe
the pool of permitted claimants. Some courts also have afforded defer-
ence to the executive branch in interpreting international legal norms.
Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2004) 239–42.
13 See Preliminary Report: Principles on Engagement of Domestic Courts
with International Law (ILA Study Group 2013) 6–9 (employing these terms to
describe the variations in the application of international law by domestic courts).
14 ibid 7.
15 The term ‘friendliness to international law’ often is attributed to Antonio
Cassese, ‘Modern Constitutions and International Law’ (1985) III Academie de
Droit International, Recueil des Cours 331, 343.
16 See Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of
Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal
of International Law 241, 242.
17 The leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject rejected the
notion that all cases that involve foreign affairs implicate the political question
doctrine. See Baker v Carr [1962] 369 US 186.
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Additionally, courts in some countries apply the doctrine of ‘non-self-
executing’ treaties as an avoidance technique. These and related avoid-
ance techniques carry particular significance for the theme of this
volume, for they enable domestic courts to weigh political considerations
in the decision whether to apply international norms to resolve specific
disputes. As a matter of emphasis, our focus here is on judicial
techniques for avoiding the application of rights founded in or derived
from international law. Thus, as used in this chapter, the term ‘avoidance
technique’ does not include doctrines – such as forum non conveniens or
lis pendens – that courts invoke to avoid deciding the merits of
cross-border disputes where the underlying substantive claim is not
founded in international law.18
1.2 The Significance of Subject Matter: Horizontal, Vertical and
Transnational Rules
The introductory chapter to this volume suggests that the relationship
between politics and international law varies across stages of governance
and governance systems. It also notes that ‘different systems of govern-
ance are demarcated by their subject matter, their scope, or both’.19 Our
analysis reveals that the relative influence of law and politics in the
attitudes of domestic courts toward international law varies considerably
across subject matter. That is, the willingness of national courts to view
an international issue as one of law – and thus within their realm of
authority notwithstanding the political implications – depends heavily on
the subject matter of the legal rule involved. Specifically, judicial
behavior varies depending on whether an international legal rule regu-
lates the ‘horizontal’ relations between states, the cross-border ‘trans-
national’ relations between private actors, or the ‘vertical’ relations
between states and private actors.
1.2.1 Horizontal rules
Part 2 analyzes the role of domestic courts in applying legal rules that
govern relations between and among sovereign states. This is the
traditional realm of interstate diplomacy dominated by political consider-
ations and national interest.
International law rules governing horizontal relations may be both
highly obligatory and highly precise. An arms control treaty with detailed
18 For more on this point see the text accompanying nn 88–89.
19 See Chapter 1.
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limits on armaments represents a good example. But even when inter-
national law has these attributes, Part 2 describes a strong presumption
that the sovereign states involved have not delegated adjudicative author-
ity to national courts. The main exception involves rules protecting the
jurisdictional immunity of states in domestic courts.
1.2.2 Transnational rules
Part 3 then examines the sharply divergent judicial attitude toward
‘transnational’ legal rules. By this term we mean international norms that
regulate cross-border legal relations between private actors. As one of us
observed,20 disputes on this plane ‘rarely have sufficient political salience
to become the subject of interstate diplomacy’.21 The benefits of uniform
law for cross-border private transactions nonetheless have led states to
adopt wide-ranging international norms governing transnational relation-
ships, including multilateral treaties in commercial law, civil procedure,
arbitration, family law and aviation law, among others.
In this realm, a legal perspective predominates, and as Part 3 explains,
judicial avoidance doctrines play a relatively small role. Instead, for
transnational rules the norm in domestic courts is harmonization. And in
sharp contrast to horizontal rules, domestic courts recognize, interpret
and apply international law here almost irrespective of the political
implications. This is true even if the relevant norms are obscure,
equitable or highly imprecise. Norms of ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonableness’
in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
represent a good example.
1.2.3 Vertical rules
Part 4 takes up the third category of international legal rules – those
governing the ‘vertical’ relations between states and private parties. This
20 David Sloss, ‘Domestic Application of Treaties’ in D. Hollis (ed), The
Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press 2012) 377.
21 This is not to suggest that the adoption of proposed transnational legal
rules always is free from controversy. Good faith disagreements, often based on
insurmountable divides between different legal systems, arise in this dimension
as well. The failed negotiation in the Hague Conference over a convention on
jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments provides ample proof of this,
as does the long list of private law treaties that have failed to attract sufficient
support to enter into force. The point here is that – at least as compared to
horizontal or even vertical rules – internationally agreed transnational norms are
substantially less likely to touch political nerves, affect the exercise of executive
discretion, or otherwise trigger high-stakes international diplomacy on essential
sovereign rights, duties, or functions.
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category includes both treaty law and customary international law related
to refugees, human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL).
When called upon to apply vertical rules, domestic courts oscillate
between harmonization and avoidance techniques, depending partly upon
whether they perceive the contested issue as legal or political.
Rules governing vertical relations between States and private actors
often present challenging issues for domestic courts. Disputes in this
realm equally may touch on sovereign functions traditionally allocated to
political discretion and implicate the traditional judicial function of
protecting private rights from governmental intrusion. Vertical rules
require, therefore, a particularly careful analysis of the form and nature
of state consent, of comparative constitutional structures, of the relative
institutional competence of the judicial branch, and of the special need
for judicial independence. Questions of legal obligation and precision
play an important role. But a key point of divergence is the domestic
courts’ own assessment of whether it is appropriate for them to apply
international legal rules to protect individual rights against infringement
by government actors.
Ultimately, as Part 4 explains, the relative influence of law and politics
in this realm depends on the extent to which particular domestic courts
adopt avoidance techniques (as in horizontal disputes) or harmonization
techniques (as in transnational disputes). But it is also on this issue,
perhaps more than any other we examine in this chapter, that a compara-
tive law perspective exposes striking differences among national court
systems.
1.3 Comparative Law Perspectives
Throughout this chapter we analyze the relative influence of law and
politics in international law from a comparative perspective. Recent years
have witnessed an increasing interest of scholars in the application of
international law in domestic legal systems. Detailed analyses now exist
for a number of states, especially on treaty law.22 We have participated in
22 See David Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement
(Cambridge University Press 2009) (‘Treaty Enforcement’); Duncan B. Hollis,
Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington (eds), National Treaty Law
and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 2005); see also The Oxford Guide to Treaties
(n 20); Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press 2007).
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some of those projects.23 We provide a brief review of the principal
system types here to set a context for the more detailed analysis that
follows.
Nearly every constitutional system contains rules for the making and
ratification of treaties (as the empirical evidence from Verdier and
Versteeg in this volume confirms).24 Some – especially more modern
ones – contain express provisions on the subject.25 Nearly 50 include
references to the domestic legal force of specific treaties, especially on
human rights.26 Other constitutional structures, especially those that
follow the British parliamentary system, have established conventions on
the subject.27 Some constitutions, though substantially fewer, also include
express references to customary international law.28
It is common in this context to draw a distinction between so-called
‘dualist’ and ‘monist’ approaches to international law. Theoretical debates
aside, we use those terms to describe two broad types of domestic legal
systems. The fundamental issue that divides the two is whether inter-
national norms have the status of law in the domestic legal system.
Treaty law provides the clearest illustration of the distinction. As one
of us has observed, ‘[t]he key distinguishing feature of dualism is that no
treaties have the formal status of law in the domestic legal system unless
the legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty into domestic
law’.29 Thus, even if the executive department has expressed consent as a
matter of international law, in dualist systems the legislature must
‘incorporate’ the treaty by standard legislation in order for it to have the
force of domestic law. Otherwise, the treaty remains ‘unincorporated’
(although, as noted below, some courts have recognized an influence for
such treaties as well). This is the approach of almost all British
Commonwealth States, as well as a few others.30
23 See Sloss (n 20); David Sloss, ‘Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts:
A Comparative Analysis’ in ‘Treaty Enforcement’ (n 22) 1–60; Michael P. Van
Alstine, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: Summary and
Conclusions’ in ‘Treaty Enforcement’ (n 22) 555–613.
24 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Modes of Domestic
Incorporation of International Law’, Chapter 6 in this volume.
25 Sloss (n 20) 373–6; Van Alstine (n 23) 566–9.
26 See Wayne Sandholtz, ‘How Domestic Courts Use International Law’
(2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 595, 605.
27 Sloss (n 20) 370–1; Van Alstine (n 23) 569–76; Verdier and Versteeg
(n 24) pt II.A.
28 See Van Alstine (n 23) 581.
29 Sloss (n 20) 370.
30 Sloss (n 20) 370.
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It is harder to generalize about states that follow a monist approach.
Nonetheless, the key feature of this type of state is that at least some
treaties function as directly applicable domestic law without implement-
ing legislation. Beyond this generalization, the monist states differ among
themselves in several respects. Because of the different approaches to
legislative consent and implementation, in this chapter we shall refer to
these states as ‘hybrid monist’.31 Some hybrid monist states require
advance legislative approval for all treaties before the executive may
express consent under international law; others require such approval
only for certain treaty types. Considerable differences also exist on which
treaties require subsequent legislative implementation. It is here that
debates over self-executing and non-self-executing treaties are most
significant. Hybrid monist states diverge as well on the hierarchical status
of treaties, with some even elevating them (in certain contexts) over the
domestic constitution.32
Despite the formal distinctions, our analysis reveals few functional
differences between dualist and hybrid monist states in the application of
international norms. Indeed, as described in Parts 2 to 4, our conclusions
about the important role of subject matter hold across the diversity of
state systems. Thus, courts in dualist and hybrid monist states alike
commonly defer to the political branches on horizontal rules (see Part 2).
With transnational rules, in contrast, courts from all system types
routinely apply appropriately sanctioned international norms to resolve
legal disputes that come before them (see Part 3).
With vertical rules, a state’s formal classification as dualist or hybrid
monist does not seem to be a decisive factor in explaining the behavior of
courts.33 Nonetheless, as Part 4 analyzes in detail, domestic courts
diverge substantially in their willingness to defer to political interests in
disputes between governments and private parties. And on no subject is
this more glaring than in the protection of international human rights.
1.4 Domestic Courts and the Stages of Governance
This volume analyzes the relationship between law and politics based on
five ‘stages of governance.’ On two of these stages, domestic courts are
31 See Van Alstine (n 23) 569–70 (employing this term).
32 See generally Sloss (n 20) 373–6; Van Alstine (n 23) 569–81.
33 Sloss (n 20) 378–9.
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frequent and substantial players.34 Interpretation of legal norms is an
essential function of an independent judiciary. Domestic courts also play
an important role in the implementation of international law by issuing
authoritative judgments in litigated disputes. These two subjects occupy
much of our attention in this chapter.
For the remaining three stages of governance, in contrast, the influence
of domestic courts is more limited. From their constitutional station and
institutional competence, domestic courts have only a circumscribed role
in international law rulemaking. In a formal sense, states make treaties,
and courts are not empowered to adjust the substance to advance broader
interests. In some systems the common law opens a channel for the
recognition of norms of customary international law. As a more general
matter, a ‘transjudicial dialogue’ may foster epistemic communities for
the recognition of such norms. But here as well, a faithful adherence to
the judicial function places constraints on judges making, as opposed to
finding, the law. A rare exception may be on the subject of conduct-based
immunity of former government officials for acts of torture committed
while in office.35
A distinct stage of governance involves decision-making by the sub-
jects of legal rules. Courts are not generally the subjects of international
legal norms – beyond the general obligation of a state institution to apply
the law created by the political branches. However, some international
rules target proceedings in domestic courts themselves. Thus, for
example, domestic courts ultimately are the subjects for the rules of
customary international law on state immunity, for the very question is
whether the court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state.36
Transnational treaties on civil procedure matters and the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards fall in the same general category.
Though limited, the actions of domestic courts are also significant in
legal change. Of their nature, independent courts are sources of ‘rule
innovation’,37 a phenomenon equally applicable to international law.
Indeed, transnational judicial dialogue may be most pronounced in the
development of customary international law. Although formally only a
34 For a broader, systematic analysis of this point see Christopher A.
Whytock, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’ (2009) 84 Tulane Law
Review 67 (examining ‘transnational judicial governance’).
35 Compare: Yousuf v Samantar [2012] 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir.) (rejecting a
claim of immunity) with Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (2006) UKHL 26 (recognizing immunity).
36 See Part 2 below.
37 Sandholtz and Sweet (n 12) 247–8.
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‘subsidiary means’ for determining the law, decisions of domestic courts
contribute to the content of the law through an iterative process of
recognition and adjustment over time. Moreover, on some subjects (for
example, immunity, court procedure, the act of state doctrine) the actions
of domestic courts, as state organs, constitute ‘state practice’ that drives
the development and modification of customary international law.
Disputes in domestic courts over the meaning and effect of treaties
likewise provide a platform for legal change. Fundamental principles of
treaty interpretation – good faith, autonomous interpretation, respect for
foreign court judgments – support the development of epistemic com-
munities among domestic courts that may lead to progressive changes in
agreed meaning over time. Some treaties even expressly or impliedly
delegate authority to courts to engage in ‘dynamic’ interpretation to
address future developments. In all of this, domestic courts, intentionally
or not, may contribute to evolution in the content of international legal
norms over time.
2. HORIZONTAL RULES
Horizontal rules regulate relationships between sovereign states. When
domestic courts confront horizontal disputes, they often view the cases as
‘political’, not ‘legal’, and they apply various avoidance techniques to
avoid decisions on the merits. The governing model of enforcement is
diplomacy, political contestation and non-judicial sanctions in the parties’
interstate relations. Here, domestic courts commonly employ avoidance
doctrines with the consequence of leaving the field free for exercise of
discretion by political actors, especially the executive branch.38 In this
realm, domestic courts do not play an active role at any of the five ‘stages
of governance’, subject to the exception of state immunity, discussed
below.
An Italian decision in Presidency of the Council of Ministers v
Markovic is illustrative.39 In April 1999, NATO forces bombed a radio
38 Cf.: Benvenisti (n 16) 242 (observing that domestic courts may resort to
avoidance doctrines ‘to align their findings and judgments with the preferences
of their governments and thus to guarantee [the governments] complete latitude
in external affairs’).
39 Presidency of the Council of Ministers v Markovic [2002] 85 Rivista di
diritto internazionale 799 ILDC 293 (IT 2002) [Markovic]. Throughout this
chapter, the abbreviation ‘ILDC’ refers to the Oxford database on International
Law in Domestic Courts. The designation ‘ILDC 293’ is an identifier assigned by
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station in Yugoslavia, killing Dejan Markovic and Slobodan Jontic.
Surviving family members filed suit in Italy against the Ministry of
Defence and others. Plaintiffs alleged violations of international human-
itarian law (IHL) rules prohibiting the use of weapons ‘directed against a
non-military objective and intentionally intended to harm civilians’.40
Defendants argued that Italian courts lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of Cassation ruled for defendants on jurisdictional grounds,
holding ‘that neither the ordinary courts nor any other court can consider
the dispute’.41 The court said: ‘The choice of a means of conducting
hostilities is an act of Government. These are acts that constitute the
manifestation of a political function … The provisions of the [Geneva
Conventions]… which govern the conduct of hostilities are… provisions
of international law [that] govern relations between States.’42
In sum, the court described the relevant legal rules as horizontal rules
that ‘govern relations between states’ and it characterized the underlying
conduct as ‘the manifestation of a political function’. These two ideas –
that the rule is horizontal and that the function is political – are closely
related. The plaintiffs thought they were asking the court to apply a
vertical rule of law that protects individual civilians from unlawful use of
weapons by state actors. From their perspective, their claim was similar
to a claim that government officers violated the European Convention on
Human Rights: a type of claim that Italian courts often adjudicate.43
However, from the court’s perspective, the fact that the use of force
occurred in the context of an international armed conflict meant that the
case was properly viewed as a horizontal dispute between states, not a
vertical dispute between state actors and private parties. Thus, Markovic
illustrates two important points. First, domestic courts often have dis-
cretion in choosing whether to frame a dispute in horizontal or vertical
terms. Second, the choice to frame it as a horizontal dispute typically
the editors of that database. Quotations from the case are taken from the English
translation available in the Oxford database.
40 Markovic (n 39) para 1.
41 Markovic (n 39) para 5.
42 ibid paras 2–3.
43 See Dorigo and President of the Council of Ministers [2011] (interven-
ing) No. 113/2011 (Corte Costituzionale, Italy) (holding that Italian courts must
re-open criminal proceedings in cases where the European Court of Human
Rights finds a violation of fair trial rights).
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means that the court views the contested issues as political, not legal, and
domestic courts generally avoid the merits of political questions.44
However, domestic courts often enforce horizontal rules on state
immunity.45 Customary international law provides that states may not
permit their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sover-
eigns, unless one of several exceptions applies.46 The rules governing
state immunity are properly viewed as horizontal rules because they
protect one state from the exercise of sovereign (judicial) power by
another state. Even so, immunity issues frequently arise in vertical
disputes between states and private parties.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ghana is illustrative. In
May 2006, a federal court in New York issued a judgment in favor of a
bond holder, NML Capital, against the Republic of Argentina, the issuer
of sovereign bonds.47 Argentina had waived its immunity from juris-
diction. However, NML could not execute the judgment because Argen-
tina did not waive its immunity from attachment. In an attempt to collect
the money it was owed, NML undertook a global search for Argentine
assets subject to attachment.48 When an Argentine naval vessel docked at
a port in Ghana, NML tried to attach the warship to collect on the prior
judgment. A lower court granted an attachment order and seized the
vessel.49 At this point, the dispute was effectively transformed from a
vertical dispute between NML and Argentina to a horizontal dispute
between Ghana and Argentina, as evidenced by the fact that Argentina
sued Ghana in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
ITLOS held that the attachment order breached an international obliga-
tion that Ghana owed to Argentina: the obligation to refrain from
44 See also Varvarin Bridge Case [2006] BGHZ 166, 384 (Federal Supreme
Court of Germany), ILDC 887 (DE 2006) (dismissing claim against Germany by
victims of NATO bombing in Serbia).
45 When courts apply rules on sovereign immunity, they typically avoid the
merits of the underlying dispute. However, sovereign immunity is not an
‘avoidance technique’ as we use the term here, because courts do not typically
apply sovereign immunity doctrine to avoid application of international law.
46 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece
Intervening) [2012] ICJ 143.
47 NML Capital, Ltd v Republic of Argentina [2006] 2006 WL 1294853
(SDNY).
48 See Republic of Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd [2014] 134 S. Ct. 2250,
2253 (noting that ‘NML has pursued discovery of Argentina’s property’ since
2003).
49 See The Republic v High Court, Commercial Division, Accra [2009] No
J5/43/2008 (Supreme Court of Ghana).
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exercising jurisdiction over Argentina in Ghana’s domestic courts.50 The
Supreme Court of Ghana remedied the breach by reversing the attach-
ment order.51
Chapter 1 identifies ‘decision-making’ as a stage of governance in
which ‘the actors whose behavior is governed by a rule’ make decisions
on the basis of that rule.52 State immunity rules are unusual because
domestic courts are key actors governed by those rules – in a practical
sense, if not a formal sense. The Supreme Court of Ghana effectively
implemented the international immunity rule by reversing the attachment
order.53 The Ghanaian Court’s decision is similar to the Italian court’s
decision in Markovic, in that both courts relied on jurisdictional rules to
avoid the merits of the underlying dispute. However, the Ghanaian Court
applied the international immunity rule to justify its jurisdictional deci-
sion, whereas the Italian court applied a domestic jurisdictional rule to
avoid application of the international (IHL) rule.
In sum, with the notable exception of rules on sovereign immunity,
domestic courts in most countries tend to view horizontal rules as
‘political’, rather than ‘legal’. For that reason, domestic courts tend to
invoke a variety of avoidance techniques to avoid judicial application of
international rules that govern state-to-state relations.
3. TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The governance system for transnational legal rules in domestic courts is
strikingly different from that for horizontal rules. By ‘transnational
rules’, we mean norms founded in or derived from international law that
regulate cross-border legal relations between private actors. (Such trans-
national rules are distinct from domestic legal rules, such as constitu-
tional limits on the territorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts that limit the
power of domestic courts to adjudicate transnational disputes.) For such
transnational rules, domestic courts play an active role almost irrespective
of the salience of political interests. In this respect, the governance
50 See The ‘ARA Libertad’ Case (Argentina v Ghana) (Provisional Meas-
ures, Order of 20 November 2012, 15 December 2012) ITLOS Reports.
51 Republic v High Court (n 49).
52 See Chapter 1.
53 The government of Ghana released the ship before the Supreme Court of
Ghana issued its ruling, but the Supreme Court decision validated the legality of
the government’s action.
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system for transnational rules in domestic courts differs even from
‘vertical’ legal rules with significant effects on private interests.
As noted in Part 1, the predominant model of governance for trans-
national legal rules is ‘judicialization’.54 In this realm, domestic courts
commonly assume, often without detailed analysis, that they have adju-
dicative authority even if the relevant norms may touch on political
sensitivities, are highly imprecise or involve substantial discretion. The
result is that courts routinely apply, interpret, and (in part) develop
transnational norms in the disputes before them.
3.1 The Significance of Multilateral Treaties
Historically, customary norms predominated in transnational private
relations in areas such as commercial and maritime law. As A. Claire
Cutler has exhaustively demonstrated, however, since the nineteenth
century domestic statutory and common law have displaced the private
customary law of the lex mercatoria.55
The active engagement of domestic courts with transnational norms
becomes clearest through their role in applying multilateral treaties.
Treaties governing transnational private relations are numerous and
practically significant. To choose just a few prominent examples, widely
accepted conventions cover enforcement of international arbitral awards
(the 1958 New York Convention, with over 150 member states); inter-
national carriage by air (the 1999 Montreal Convention, with over 110
member states); the civil aspects of international child abduction (the
1980 Hague Convention, with nearly 100 member states); and contracts
for the international sale of goods (the 1980 Vienna Convention (CISG),
with over 80 member states). Numerous other treaties cover other aspects
of commercial and family law, as well as civil procedure and other
private law subjects.
The practical significance of these transnational treaties finds expres-
sion in the fact that the distinction between dualist and hybrid monist
states becomes almost entirely irrelevant in this realm. ‘Scheduling’ is a
common means for the incorporation of such treaties in dualist states.
Under this practice, the legislature gives a treaty the force of domestic
54 See A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge
University Press 2003) 2 (citing a trend toward ‘the juridification of political,
social, and economic life’).
55 See ibid 141–79.
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law by appending its text to an implementing statute.56 Thus, for
example, the U.K.’s Child Abduction and Custody Act of 1985 declares
that ‘the provisions of that [Hague] Convention set out in Schedule 1 to
this Act shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom’.57 The result
is that the treaty itself falls within the adjudicative authority of domestic
courts.
The result is similar in hybrid monist states. For such states, some
treaties function as directly applicable domestic law. But in contrast to
vertical treaties, transnational treaties have not triggered debates over
‘self-execution’ (or ‘direct effect’).58 Rather, either the political depart-
ments declare in advance that the treaties have direct effect, or domestic
courts simply assume, with little analysis, that this is the case. Even in
the sometimes-sceptical United States, the issue of self-execution of
transnational treaties has barely caused a ripple in judicial analysis.59
Domestic courts rely on such treaties not merely as ‘persuasive
authority’ – which ‘attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it’60 – but
rather as binding and directly enforceable domestic law. And with the
force of law, transnational treaties fall within the adjudicative authority of
domestic courts, like norms of a purely domestic origin.61 Thus, in both
dualist and hybrid monist states transnational treaties are perhaps the
‘hardest’ of international legal norms in the routine work of domestic
courts.
56 See Van Alstine (n 23) 568–9 (summarizing the practice for Australia,
Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom).
57 Child Abduction and Custody Act of 1985 s 1; see also, e.g. Kenya’s
International Interests in Aircraft Equipment Act of 2013 s 4 (providing that the
Cape Town Convention and its protocol on aircraft equipment ‘shall have the
force of law’); Canada’s International Sale of Goods Contracts Convention Act of
1991 s 4 (declaring that the UN Sales Convention has ‘the force of law in
Canada’).
58 See Van Alstine (n 23) 599–603.
59 See, e.g. Ozaltin v Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 359–60 (2nd Cir. 2013)
(declaring that the Hague Child Abduction Convention is self-executing); Han-
wha Corp v Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc, 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (SDNY 2011)
(same for the CISG); Baah v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd, 473 F. Supp. 2d 591,
593 (SDNY 2007) (same for the Montreal Air Carriage Convention). See also,
generally, David Sloss, ‘United States’ 504 et seq., in Treaty Enforcement (n 22)
(comprehensively analyzing the application of treaties by US courts).
60 Sandholtz (n 26) 611–12 (quoting H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Author-
ity’ (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal 261, 263).
61 See, e.g. 28 USC s 1331 (providing that federal district courts in the
United States ‘shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under …
treaties of the United States’).
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Although often overlooked by public law scholars, treaties governing
private relations are among the most common sources for the application
of international law in domestic courts. Such treaties have generated
thousands of reported opinions (and likely many more unreported ones).
Judicial decisions applying the CISG alone number over 10,000.62 At
least 1750 domestic court decisions apply the New York Convention.63
The International Child Abduction Database of the Hague Conference
lists nearly 1000 domestic court opinions.64 The Montreal Convention
and its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, have generated over 660
decisions in total in just six jurisdictions.65 These formally reported
opinions likely only scratch the surface in the routine resolution of
disputes by domestic courts in commercial law, civil procedure, family
law, aviation law and the many other fields now governed by trans-
national treaties.
3.2 The Pre-eminence of Law over Politics
The primary theme of this volume is that the relative influence of law
and politics varies according to the sites in which their relationship
unfolds. At the site of domestic court application of transnational legal
norms, law predominates over politics in nearly every respect.
The realm of transnational private relations is highly ‘legalized’. Thus,
the permissible grounds for argumentation by disputants (the ‘argumen-
tation frameworks’)66 are legal (not political) in source, form, and
content. Litigants and judges alike revert to ‘the text, purpose, and history
of the rules, their interpretation, admissible exceptions, applicability to
classes of situations, and particular facts’.67 Likewise, the dominant
model of judicial decision-making is ‘legal’.68 Judges cite transnational
treaties ‘because they contain relevant law and interpretive guidelines’
that are binding in the domestic legal system. Although of course relevant
(as for all judicial decision-making), theories of ‘attitudinal’ judging (that
62 See CISG Database, accessed 12 September 2016 at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-cases-toc.html.
63 See http://newyorkconvention.org, accessed 12 September 2016.
64 See http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=text.text&lng=1 accessed 12
September 2016.
65 A search of the WestLaw database revealed 653 cases that have cited the
Warsaw or Montreal Conventions in just Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, South
Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.
66 Sandholtz and Sweet (n 12) 245–7.
67 ibid 245–7.
68 See Sandholtz (n 26) 611.
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is, based on political or ideological preferences) or ‘strategic’ judging
(that is, to satisfy the interests of other institutional actors such as the
executive, the legislature or public opinion)69 do not appear to feature
prominently in the judicial application of such treaties.70
The contrast with horizontal, and even many vertical, rules in this
respect is striking. The attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court provides a
clear example. That court hardly is ‘friendly’ to international law, as its
decisions on Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(a vertical provision) amply demonstrate.71 But the Court has embraced
transnational legal norms with enthusiasm. Thus, for example, the Court
issued this declaration in a custody dispute governed by the Hague Child
Abduction Convention:
Custody decisions are often difficult. Judges must strive always to avoid a
common tendency to prefer their own society and culture[.] International law
serves a high purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to rely
upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by legitimate and fair
proceedings.72
The touchstone nonetheless remains legal, as the Court emphasized in a
recent opinion applying the same treaty. In a marked departure from its
reliance on procedural default rules in disputes over the Vienna Consular
Convention, the Court declared that it was ‘unwilling to apply equitable
tolling principles that would, in practice, rewrite the treaty’.73
Domestic courts throughout the world routinely assume that they have
adjudicative authority even for transnational norms that only dimly
satisfy the other recognized attributes of ‘legalization’ (obligation and
precision).74 Many provisions in transnational treaties are highly indefin-
ite or involve substantial discretion. For example, the Hague Child
Abduction Convention recognizes an exception if a return order would
place a child in an ‘intolerable situation’.75 As a more general matter, as
69 ibid 611 (reviewing models of judicial decision-making).
70 Cf.: Christopher A. Whytock, ‘The Evolving Forum Shopping System’
(2011) 96 Cornell Law Review 481, 525–8 (finding no statistically significant
differences in outcomes on forum non conveniens motions in the United States as
between judges of different political parties).
71 See, e.g. Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon [2006] 548 US 331; Breard v Greene
[1998] 523 US 371 (per curiam).
72 Abbott v Abbott [2010] 560 US 1, 20.
73 Lozano v Montoya Alvarez [2014] 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235.
74 See text accompanying nn 7–12.
75 See art 13.
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the U.K. House of Lords has observed, ‘[i]nternational jurisprudence
supports a broad interpretation of the factors that may be relevant in the
discretionary exercise’ of returning under that treaty.76 The CISG also
repeatedly defines rights or obligations by what is ‘reasonable’ or
‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.77 And the New York Convention
grants exceptions based on an absence of ‘proper notice’ or ‘public
policy’.78 Numerous similar examples exist in other transnational treaties.
Notwithstanding such highly imprecise norms, domestic courts routinely
adopt the ‘legal’ model of judicial decision-making. They interpret and
apply the treaties as binding legal norms – even if doing so requires the
exercise of substantial judicial discretion.
Domestic courts also do so in situations of high political salience.
Granted, transnational legal rules rarely touch on political nerves in an
appreciable way (compared to horizontal and vertical rules). Disputes
involving transnational rules simply are too numerous or mundane for the
executive branch to assert its policy preferences on a regular basis.
Moreover, the competing interests often cut across the political divide: A
buyer or seller in an international sale is equally likely to be a member of
one political party as another; so too is a father or mother in an
international child custody dispute. As a result, the political branches
commonly are content to leave the resolution of the related legal issues to
the courts.79
Even transnational disputes, however, sometimes trigger significant
international political conflicts. For example, controversies over the
alleged failure of some foreign courts to adhere to the Hague Child
Abduction Convention recently spawned a special statute in the United
States authorizing targeted sanctions by the executive branch.80 Similarly,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently highlighted ‘the diplomatic conse-
quences resulting from this Court’s interpretation of “rights of custody”’
under the Convention, ‘including the likely reaction of other contracting
states and the impact on the State Department’s ability to reclaim
76 See In re M and Another [2007] UKHL 55.
77 See arts 34, 35(2)(b), 37, 48(1), 60(a), 75, 77, 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(1),
86(2), 87, 88(2), 88(3).
78 See arts V(1)(b), V(2)(b).
79 See Mark A. Graber, ‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Defer-
ence to the Judiciary’ (1993) 7 Studies in American Political Development 35
(demonstrating that party moderates across the political divide sometimes invite
the judiciary to resolve certain sensitive issues).
80 See The Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Preven-
tion and Return Act of 2014 22 USC s 9101 et seq.
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children abducted from [the United States]’.81 Nonetheless, the Court
proceeded to interpret and apply the Convention. Likewise, one finds
little weighing of political sensitivities in the application of transnational
legal norms by domestic courts around the world.
This is true even for domestic courts in states that do not have an
exemplary reputation for judicial independence. Thus, courts in China
have issued scores of opinions on the CISG,82 applied aviation treaties
(beginning with a landmark opinion by a District Court in Shanghai),83
and enforced arbitral awards under the New York Convention.84
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, judicial avoidance
doctrines have played a quite limited role in the realm of transnational
legal relations. One finds here almost no mention of political question,
non-justiciability or similar doctrines. Likewise, the debate over whether
particular treaty provisions are ‘self-executing’ or have ‘direct effect’
simply has not featured prominently in transnational disputes. Most
domestic courts do not grant deference to the executive branch in treaty
interpretation.85 Although United States courts occasionally use the
rhetoric of deference in cases involving transnational rules,86 little
evidence exists that the executive branch has exercised political influence
over judicial decisions.87
To be sure, domestic courts also employ a variety of ‘generic’ doctrines
– including forum non conveniens, lis pendens, limits on the adjudicative
81 Abbott v Abbott (n 72) 15.
82 See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#china accessed 12
September 2016.
83 See Hong v United Airlines Incorporated (Dist. Ct. of Shanghai, First
instance, 26 November 2001) 4 Gazette of Supreme People’s Court of the
People’s Republic of China 141, [2000] Min Jing Chu No 1639, ILDC 780 (CN
2001) (applying the Warsaw Convention on international air carriage).
84 See http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions/decisions-per-
country#chinapr accessed 12 September 2016. See also Xue Hanqin and Jin
Qian, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’ (2009) 8
Chinese Journal of International Law 299.
85 See Van Alstine (n 23) 592–3.
86 Abbott v Abbott (n 72) 15; El Al Israel Airlines v Tsui Yuan Tseng [1999]
525 US 155, 168.
87 The US executive branch often expresses its opinion on the interpretation
of transnational treaties in the form of amicus curiae briefs, and it is not
uncommon for the Supreme Court to agree with those expressed opinions. See,
e.g. Abbott v Abbott (n 22) 15 (noting that the Court’s interpretation of the Hague
Child Abduction Convention was ‘supported and informed by the State Depart-
ment’s view on the issue’).
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jurisdiction of domestic courts, and limits on the extraterritorial appli-
cation of domestic statutes – that affect where, how, and by what rules
ordinary transnational disputes are resolved. Judicial application of such
doctrines may have significant effects on substantive outcomes. And as
domestic courts increasingly recognize and regularize the application of
such generic doctrines they indeed engage in ‘transnational judicial
governance’.88 Though important on their own plane, however, these
generic judicial doctrines are of a different nature from the ‘transnational
legal rules’ we examine here (that is, those founded in or derived from
international law). Moreover, the available evidence indicates that these
generic judicial doctrines have no greater salience in cross-border cases
involving the judicial application of international legal norms than they
do in cross-border cases involving judicial application of domestic legal
norms.89
88 See Whytock (n 34) (employing this term).
89 The clearest evidence comes from the application of forum non conven-
iens in cases involving private treaty rights (the most prominent of the trans-
national legal rules we analyze here). Indeed, some US courts have held that
such treaty rights prohibit, or at least limit judicial discretion in the application
of, forum non conveniens defenses. See, e.g. Hosaka v United Airlines, Inc, 305
F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that forum non conveniens cannot be
invoked to transfer a case brought under the Warsaw Convention); Milor v British
Airways Plc [1996] QB 702, 706 (English Court of Appeals) (same); Cour de
Cassation le civ [7 December 2011] Bull. civ. I, No. Q10–30.919 (France) (same
for Montreal Convention). Other courts have held that treaty rights have no effect
at all on the analysis of forum non conveniens defenses. See, e.g. Kisano Trade &
Invest Ltd v Lemster, 737 F.3d 869, 875 (3rd Cir. 2013) (holding that a
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty ‘does nothing to disturb’ standard
forum non conveniens analysis); Pierre-Louis v Newvac Corp, 584 F.3d 1052,
1058 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that ‘traditional forum non conveniens analysis’
applies for actions brought under the Montreal Convention). Other courts
applying transnational legal rules have given no indication whatsoever that the
fact that the underlying substantive rule is rooted in international law affects
forum non conveniens analysis. See, e.g. Belcher-Robinson, LLC v Linamar
Corp, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338–9 (MD Ala. 2010) (regarding the CISG);
Genpharm Inc v Pliva-Lachema as, 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 59–61 (EDNY 2005)
(same). The same is true on the consideration of lis pendens claims in cases
based on transnational treaty rights. See, e.g. Palm Bay Intern, Inc v Marchesi Di
Barolo SPA, 659 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413–414 (EDNY 2009).
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3.3 Domestic Court Engagement and the Stages of Governance
As noted in Part 1, domestic courts generally do not play an active role in
rulemaking or decision-making regarding international legal norms. But
for transnational legal rules, domestic courts have noteworthy influence
in interpretation, implementation and progressive development over time.
The role of domestic courts in the interpretation of transnational legal
norms is expansive and significant. The influence of domestic courts has
become most pronounced through the process of developing an inter-
national consensus on the meaning of treaty provisions. Determining the
meaning of treaties leaves considerable discretion for domestic courts in
their primary duty ‘to say what the law is’.90 For transnational legal rules,
this essential judicial role creates a platform for a process of judicial
dialogue across jurisdictions. The foundation for this process is the
recognition, including by courts from dualist states,91 that the relevant
source of interpretive evidence is the treaty itself, including its drafting
history (travaux préparatoires) and the subsequent practice of states.
Most courts rely on the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.92 With the foundation of uniform source materials and
principles, together with a recognized goal of uniform interpretation, the
result has been substantial cooperation and collaboration by domestic
courts around the world.
Of great importance in this cooperation is the widespread reliance on
the opinions of courts from other treaty member states.93 Courts from
dualist94 and hybrid monist95 traditions alike have emphasized that
decisions of other member state courts are ‘entitled to considerable
90 Marbury v Madison [1803] 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177.
91 See Povey v Qantas Airways Limited [2005] HCA 33 (2005) (High Court
of Australia) (involving a claim by a passenger against an airline); Sidhu v British
Airways Plc [1997] AC 430, 443 (House of Lords) (same).
92 See Van Alstine (n 23) 587–91.
93 See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpret-
ation’ in H.P. Aust and G. Nolte (eds), Interpretation of International Law by
Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 2016).
94 See, e.g. Smallmon v Transport Sales Ltd [2010] Civ.-2009-409-000363
para 82 (High Court of New Zealand) (applying the CISG); In re M and Another
(n 76) (applying the Hague Child Abduction Convention); Povey v Qantas
Airways Limited (n 92) (applying the Warsaw Convention).
95 See, e.g. Van Alstine (n 23) 591–2 (noting the practice by courts in the
Netherlands, Poland, and Germany).
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weight’ (in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court).96 Indeed, for trans-
national treaties, ‘transnational judicial dialogue’ is not merely theoretical
or aspirational. A formal International Hague Network of Judges (com-
posed of domestic judges from 61 jurisdictions) works to secure uniform
interpretations of the Hague Child Abduction Convention.97 Official
compilations of domestic court interpretations also exist to advance
uniformity in the application of other transnational treaties. And, signifi-
cantly, this substantial judicial cooperation transpires without the formal
involvement of the political branches.
The influence of domestic courts on decision-making (as noted in Part
1) is limited, even for transnational legal rules. The narrow exception is
for treaties that provide rules affecting procedure in the courts them-
selves. Thus, in a real sense, domestic courts are the subjects of
transnational treaties on service of process and taking of evidence
abroad,98 as well as the New York Convention on the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Nonetheless, for these treaties as well, a legal perspective
predominates, and there is little evidence that political considerations
play a noteworthy role in decision-making by domestic courts.
Domestic courts fulfill an essential function in the implementation of
transnational legal norms. In disputes between private parties, domestic
courts are the principal state institutions in this stage of governance based
on their authority to issue final judgments. But again, the governing
model here is ‘judicialization’. In nearly all cases, courts treat norms that
regulate transnational private relations as legal in nature and thus subject
to the courts’ traditional adjudicative authority in disputes properly before
them. Resort to avoidance doctrines as a cover for political sensitivities is
neither common nor significant. At the site of the implementation of
transnational rules by domestic courts, in short, law nearly always
triumphs over politics.
96 Abbott v Abbott (n 72) 20 (quoting an earlier opinion).
97 See Judith Kreeger, ‘The International Hague Judicial Network – A
Progressing Work’ (2014) 48 Family Law Quarterly 221; Robin Moglove
Diamond, ‘The International Hague Network of Judges’ (2013), accessed 12
September 2016 at http://www.iawj.org/International_Hague_Network_of_
Judges-Justice_Diamond.pdf.
98 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters (adopted 15 November 1965, entered into
force 10 February 1969) 658 UNTS 163; Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (opened for signature 18 March 1970,
entered into force 7 October 1972) 23 UST 2555.
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Regarding legal change in transnational rules, domestic courts do not
have formal authority to modify the law created by the political branches.
But transnational treaties, more than any other type, require active
engagement by domestic courts to ensure the continued fulfillment of
their purpose over time. Of their nature, such treaties regulate the
activities of substantially more actors and in dynamic social and tech-
nological environments. As a result, over time the domestic courts
charged with interpretation and application increasingly confront issues
that the drafters did not foresee, or simply chose not to resolve. To ensure
the continued vitality and relevance of such treaties, domestic courts
must adapt their provisions to new and unexpected environments.99
Indeed, some commercial law treaties expressly empower domestic
courts to fill regulatory gaps as they emerge over time, which one of us
has described as a delegated authority to engage in ‘dynamic treaty
interpretation’.100 The result is that domestic courts have the power
(whether formally or practically) to effect legal change in fulfillment of
the fundamental purposes of transnational treaties.
In sum, in the realm of transnational legal rules a legal perspective
predominates. Domestic courts recognize, interpret and apply trans-
national rules as a routine, almost prosaic, part of the standard judicial
function. Judicial avoidance doctrines (political question, non-
justiciability, non-self-execution) likewise have not played a conspicuous,
or even noticeable, role. And this is true irrespective of potential political
implications, even if the transnational rules at issue are highly imprecise
or involve the exercise of substantial judicial discretion.
4. VERTICAL RULES
It is difficult to formulate general statements describing application of
vertical international rules by domestic courts because national legal
systems vary greatly. Even so, to identify some order amidst the chaos,
three preliminary observations may be helpful. First, following the theme
99 In situations of doubt, some courts even have turned to a decidedly ‘soft’
form of international norms, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts. See Michael Bonell, ‘The CISG, European Contract Law and the
Development of a World Contract law’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 1, 22–25 (surveying the application of the Principles by domestic courts
and arbitral tribunals).
100 See Michael P. Van Alstine, ‘Dynamic Treaty Interpretation’ (1998)
146(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 687, 726–91.
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introduced in Part 1, this Part focuses on countries with independent
judiciaries. In states whose judicial branch is not truly independent,
domestic courts rarely provide remedies to private parties when govern-
ment actors violate domestic legal norms,101 so they can hardly be
expected to provide remedies when government actors violate inter-
national norms. Second, one can distinguish between cases where the
government invokes an international norm to justify imposing a sanction
on a private party (as in domestic application of international criminal
law),102 and cases where a private actor seeks a remedy against the
government for violation of an international norm. This Part focuses on
cases in the latter category. Third, one can distinguish between cases
where private litigants file suit in State A against domestic government
actors from State A, and cases where litigants file suit in State A against
foreign government actors from State B.103 This Part focuses on cases
where litigants ask courts to hold domestic officials accountable for
violations of international norms. Three distinct bodies of law account for
most domestic litigation in this field: international human rights law,
international refugee law and international humanitarian law (IHL).104
The following analysis cites examples from all three areas.
In states with independent judiciaries, domestic courts frequently
provide remedies for private parties whose rights are violated by govern-
ment actors. If the norm at issue is a domestic legal norm, courts perform
their routine functions. But if the norm at issue is an international legal
norm, courts apply harmonization techniques in some cases and avoid-
ance techniques in others. When courts apply harmonization techniques,
they effectively treat the contested issue as a legal issue. When they apply
avoidance techniques, they treat the contested issue as a political issue.
Hence, the key question is this: In cases where private actors seek
101 See, e.g. ‘U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2013, Venezuela’ 14–17 (discussing denial of fair trial rights).
102 See, e.g. Canada v Mugesera [2005] 2 SCR 100, ILDC 180 (Supreme
Court of Canada) (ordering deportation of Rwandan national accused of incite-
ment to commit genocide).
103 See, e.g. Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420, ILDC 1226 (High Court of
New Zealand) (claim filed in New Zealand against Chinese government officials
based upon acts of torture allegedly committed in China).
104 IHL can be divided broadly into three sets of rules: (a) rules governing
the means and methods of warfare; (b) rules governing the treatment of detainees
in armed conflict; and (c) rules related to administration of occupied territory.
Domestic courts tend to view cases involving means and methods of warfare as
horizontal cases, whereas they tend to view cases in the other two categories as
vertical cases.
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remedies against domestic officials for alleged violations of international
legal norms,105 how can we explain decisions by domestic courts to apply
harmonization techniques in some cases and avoidance techniques in
others? To address this question, we distinguish among three methods for
applying international law: (1) ‘silent application,’ where courts apply a
domestic rule derived from international law without mentioning inter-
national sources; (2) ‘indirect application,’ where courts apply inter-
national law as a guide to interpreting domestic statutory or constitutional
provisions; and (3) ‘direct application,’ where courts apply international
law directly as a rule of decision. Each of these methods involves
domestic courts in two prominent stages of governance: the interpret-
ation and implementation of international law.
4.1 Silent Application of International Law
When judges apply domestic legal rules, they often do so without
acknowledging that those ‘domestic’ rules are derived from international
norms. Several countries adopted new Constitutions in the decades after
World War II. Many of those new Constitutions include Bill of Rights
provisions that were heavily influenced by international human rights
instruments.106 Domestic courts often apply those Bill of Rights pro-
visions without mentioning international law. For example, the drafters of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has constitutional
status in Canada, ‘looked to Canada’s international treaty obligations,
especially the ICCPR, for inspiration and guidance’.107 Even so, the
Supreme Court of Canada rarely looks to international law for guidance
in interpreting the Charter.108 When courts apply domestic constitutional
provisions modeled on international human rights provisions, the effect
may be to harmonize international and domestic norms, because the
105 This formulation encompasses cases where private actors raise inter-
national law defenses in actions initiated by the government, as well as cases
where private plaintiffs bring civil suits against government actors.
106 See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and Beth Simmons, ‘Getting to
Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights
Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 61, 63 (showing that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ‘have played crucial roles in the spread of formal human
rights into national constitutions’).
107 Gib van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts (2nd edn, Irwin
Law 2008) 333.
108 See ibid 332–7.
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constitutional drafters internalized the international norm into domestic
constitutional law.
A similar process occurs when national legislatures incorporate inter-
national norms into domestic statutes. For example, the United States
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 to implement its obligations under the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.109 The U.S. Supreme
Court has occasionally referenced international sources expressly in an
effort to harmonize its interpretation of the statute with the nation’s
international legal obligations.110 In most cases, though, U.S. courts
apply the statute without reference to the Protocol or other international
legal authorities.111 The courts’ narrow focus on the statute may some-
times create discrepancies between international and domestic rules.
However, in many cases, straightforward application of the domestic
statute on its own terms promotes harmony with the international norm
because Congress incorporated the international norm into the statute.112
It is impossible to measure the harmonizing effects of different methods
for domestic application of international law, but incorporation of inter-
national law into domestic constitutional and statutory provisions is
undoubtedly one of the more effective techniques for entrenching inter-
national law in the realm of ‘law’, rather than ‘politics’.
4.2 Indirect Application of International Law
4.2.1 International law in statutory interpretation
Indirect application of international law as a guide to statutory interpret-
ation is probably the most widely used overt judicial technique for
109 See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca [1987] 480 US 421, 436–37. More than 100
legislative provisions in the U.S. define legal norms with reference to ‘the law of
nations’ or ‘international law’. See Michael P. Van Alstine, ‘Stare Decisis and
Foreign Affairs’ (2012) 61 Duke Law Journal 941, 977–8.
110 See INS v Cardoza-Fonseca (n 109).
111 See, e.g. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec 357 (BIA 1996) (holding that
the practice of female genital mutilation can be the basis for a grant of asylum
under the federal statute). The main opinion in Kasinga did not mention the
Protocol, but Board Member Rosenberg’s concurring opinion did reference the
Protocol.
112 The domestic definition of refugee, codified at 8 USC s 1101(a)(42), is
substantially identical to the international definition. See Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (opened for signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22
April 1954) 189 UNTS 150 art 1 (defining the term ‘refugee’) and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force
4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 art 1 (modifying that definition).
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harmonizing domestic law with international norms.113 Domestic courts
in numerous states apply an interpretive presumption that domestic
statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with international
norms, including both treaties and customary international law. This
interpretive presumption is sometimes called a ‘presumption of conform-
ity’ or a ‘presumption of compatibility’.114 In the United States, it is
referred to as the Charming Betsy canon.115 Courts in hybrid monist
states – including Germany,116 the Netherlands,117 Poland,118 South
Africa119 and the United States120 – apply the presumption frequently in
cases involving vertical rules to help ensure that government conduct
conforms to the nation’s international legal obligations. Similarly, domes-
tic courts in strict dualist states – including Australia,121 Canada,122
India,123 Israel124 and the United Kingdom125 – apply the presumption in
a very similar manner. There do not appear to be any significant
differences between hybrid monist states, as a group, and dualist states,
as a group, in terms of the manner in which they apply the presumption
of conformity. Notably, courts in dualist states frequently apply the
presumption to unincorporated treaties in roughly the same way that they
apply it to incorporated treaties.126
113 This paragraph and the next borrow heavily from Sloss (n 20).
114 See, e.g. Gib van Ert, ‘Canada’ 166, 188–97 in Treaty Enforcement
(n 22); David Kretzmer, ‘Israel’ 273, 287–92 in Treaty Enforcement (n 22).
115 The canon takes its name from an 1804 decision by Chief Justice
Marshall. See Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy [1804] 6 US 64, 118.
116 See Andreas L. Paulus, ‘Germany’ 209 in Treaty Enforcement (n 22)
(‘German courts are also bound to interpret domestic law, as far as possible, in a
way that avoids the breach of international legal obligations’).
117 See André Nollkaemper, ‘The Netherlands’ 326, 348–51 in Treaty
Enforcement (n 22).
118 See Lech Garlicki, Malgorzata Masternak-Kubiak and Krzysztof
Wójtowicz, ‘Poland’ 370, 404 in Treaty Enforcement (n 22).
119 See John Dugard, ‘South Africa’ 448, 457 in Treaty Enforcement (n 22).
120 See David Sloss, ‘United States’ 504, 526-27 in Treaty Enforcement
(n 22).
121 See Donald R. Rothwell, ‘Australia’ 120, 152–6 in Treaty Enforcement
(n 22).
122 See van Ert (n 114) 188–97.
123 See Nihal Jayawickrama, ‘India’ 243, 247–51 in Treaty Enforcement
(n 22).
124 See Kretzmer (n 114) 287–92.
125 See Anthony Aust, ‘United Kingdom’ 476, 482-83 in Treaty Enforcement
(n 22).
126 See Van Alstine (n 23) 593–5, 608–10.
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One recurring issue concerns the threshold conditions necessary to
trigger application of the presumption. There is broad agreement that
courts may apply the presumption in cases where the statute is facially
ambiguous. The Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, holding that
‘it is reasonable to make reference to an international agreement at the
very outset of the inquiry to determine if there is any ambiguity, even
latent, in the domestic legislation’.127 Former Justice Kirby advocated a
similar approach in Australia, arguing that courts should refer to inter-
national law ‘not only when there exists statutory ambiguity, but also
where the construction of a statute would result in an interpretation
contrary to international human rights standards’.128 However, the major-
ity of the Australian High Court has rejected this approach, refusing ‘to
endorse a wider role for [international law] in statutory interpretation
other than where the legislature has clearly envisaged such a role or
where there exists a clear ambiguity on the face of the statute’.129
Although the presumption of conformity is a well-established principle
of statutory interpretation in most countries with independent judiciaries,
application of the principle is inconsistent. In most countries, careful
scrutiny of judicial decisions would probably reveal numerous cases
where the presumption was potentially applicable, but courts did not
apply it.130 In part, judicial failure to apply the presumption in cases
where it is potentially relevant may be indicative of litigators’ failure to
raise the issue. In part, though, inconsistent application of the presump-
tion also manifests a tendency to apply the presumption in cases where
harmonization of domestic with international law yields results that the
judge considers normatively appealing, and to avoid applying it in cases
where harmonization with international law would yield unattractive
results. For vertical rules that regulate government conduct, one might
describe the latter situation as a ‘silent’ avoidance technique – the result
is that courts refuse to apply the international rule in deference to the
government’s interests.
In addition to applying a presumption of conformity as a guide to
statutory interpretation, courts have also applied international law in
127 National Corn Growers Association v Canada [1990] 2 SCR 1324,
1372–3.
128 See Rothwell (n 121) 153–4.
129 ibid 156.
130 See, e.g. INS v Aguirre-Aguirre [1999] 526 US 415 (where foreign
national sought to avoid deportation by invoking the Refugee Protocol, the Court
applied a domestic statute as the controlling rule without mentioning the
Charming Betsy canon).
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cases involving judicial review of administrative action. For example,
Israel’s Supreme Court routinely applies Geneva Convention IV (GC IV)
to review the legality of actions by military authorities in the Occupied
Territories.131 The court has justified judicial application of GC IV – even
though it has no formal status as law in Israel – by invoking the
government’s declared commitment to ‘respect the humanitarian pro-
visions of the Convention’. The Australian High Court’s reasoning in
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh132 is similar
to the Israeli Supreme Court’s approach to GC IV. In Teoh, the govern-
ment ordered deportation of a Malaysian national who had six young
children in Australia. Teoh argued that the deportation order violated the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, an unincorporated treaty that has
no formal status as law in Australia. The High Court said:
[R]atification of a convention is a positive statement by the executive
government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the
executive government and its agencies will act in accordance with the
Convention. The positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate
expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that
administrative decision-makers will act in conformity with the Convention
and treat the best interests of the children as a primary consideration.133
The High Court ruled in favor of Teoh because he had a legitimate
expectation that the government would act in accordance with treaty
requirements, and the government failed to meet that expectation.134
Courts in other dualist states have generally declined to adopt the
‘legitimate expectations’ doctrine,135 although Canadian courts have
achieved similar results by applying the presumption of conformity.136
4.2.2 Human rights and constitutional interpretation
Courts in both hybrid monist and dualist states apply international law –
especially international human rights law – as an aid to interpreting
national constitutions. Countries in Europe and Latin America that are
subject to supranational judicial review, respectively, by the European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
131 See Kretzmer (n 114) 309–14.
132 [1995] 128 ALR 353.
133 Rothwell (n 121) 148 (quoting Teoh (n 132) 36).
134 See ibid 146–9.
135 See van Ert (n 114) 173; Aust (n 125) 482 n.37.
136 See van Ert (n 114) 194–5 (discussing Baker v Canada [1999] 2 SCR
817).
108 Research handbook on the politics of international law
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Sandholtz-Research_handbook_politics_of_international_law / Division: 08_Chapter4 /Pg. Position: 30
/ Date: 28/11
JOBNAME: Sandholtz PAGE: 31 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Thu Dec 1 13:20:44 2016
use international law to harmonize domestic constitutional law with the
jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals. For example, Peru’s
Constitutional Court has said that Peruvian courts must interpret consti-
tutional provisions pertaining to rights and liberties in a manner that is
consistent with decisions of the Inter-American Court.137 Indeed, Inter-
American Court decisions holding that national amnesty laws contravene
human rights treaty obligations have had significant impact on constitu-
tional developments in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru.138 Ger-
many’s Constitutional Court has said that the German constitutional order
is open towards international law, and that constitutional provisions
should be interpreted in light of international law to avoid conflicts with
Germany’s international obligations.139 Poland’s Constitutional Court
invokes the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions of the
European Court ‘as additional arguments in establishing the scope and
meaning of relevant constitutional provisions’.140
International human rights law has also exerted significant influence on
constitutional jurisprudence in some states that are not subject to the
jurisdiction of regional human rights tribunals.141 South Africa and India
are leading examples.142 The South African Constitution states: ‘When
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum … must
consider international law; and may consider foreign law’.143 Given this
constitutional mandate, the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional
Court is broadly consistent with the principle ‘that the spirit, purport and
objects of the bill of rights … are inextricably linked to international law
and the values and approaches of the international community’.144
Similarly, India’s Constitution states: ‘The State shall endeavor to …
foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings
137 President of the Lima Bar Association v Ministry of Defence [2006] Exp
No, 0012-2006-PI/TC, ILDC 671 (Constitutional Court, Peru).
138 See Christina Binder, ‘The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1203,
1218–26.
139 German Consular Notification Case, F v T [2006] 2 BvR 2115/01, ILDC
668 (Constitutional Court, Germany 2006). See also Paulus (n 116) 232.
140 Garlicki and others (n 118) 405.
141 This paragraph and the next borrow heavily from Sloss (n 20).
142 See generally Jayawickrama (n 123); Dugard (n 119).
143 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa s 39(1).
144 N. Botha, ‘The Role of International Law in the Development of South
African Common Law’ (2001) South Africa Yearbook of International Law 252,
259.
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of organized peoples with one another.’145 Accordingly, decisions by
India’s Supreme Court manifest a view ‘that any international convention
not inconsistent with the fundamental rights provisions in the Constitu-
tion and in harmony with its spirit must be read into those provisions to
enlarge the meaning and content thereof’.146
In contrast, the use of international law in constitutional interpretation
has been controversial in Australia and the United States. In Australia,
former Justice Kirby was a strong advocate for judicial application of
international law in constitutional interpretation, but he never persuaded a
majority of the High Court to adopt his preferred approach.147 The U.S.
Supreme Court has occasionally cited international human rights law to
support its interpretation of a contested constitutional provision. In every
such case, though, the majority’s reliance on international law provoked a
sharp dissent.148 The contrast between India and South Africa, on one
hand, and the United States and Australia, on the other, suggests that
countries with newer constitutions tend to embrace the use of inter-
national human rights law in constitutional interpretation. However,
countries with older constitutional traditions are more hesitant to apply
international law in constitutional interpretation, unless they are subject
to the jurisdiction of an international human rights tribunal.
4.3 Direct Application of International Law
4.3.1 Direct application of treaties
In strict dualist states, direct application of treaties is not possible
because treaties are not part of the domestic legal order unless the
legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty. Once a treaty has
been incorporated, courts apply the statute, not the treaty, at least as a
formal matter. Courts in dualist states apply other techniques to harmon-
ize domestic law with international law, but direct application of treaties
is not an available option.149
In hybrid monist states, some or all treaties have domestic legal force,
even without implementing legislation. However, the fact that a treaty has
domestic legal force does not necessarily mean that it is directly
145 Constitution of India s 51.
146 Jayawickrama (n 123) 246.
147 See Rothwell (n 121) 156–8.
148 See, e.g. Graham v Florida [2010] 560 US 48; Roper v Simmons [2005]
543 US 551; Lawrence v Texas [2003] 539 US 558.
149 See Sloss (n 20) 370–3.
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applicable by courts.150 In most hybrid monist states, treaties are directly
applicable if they are intended to benefit private parties, provided that the
particular treaty provision at issue is sufficiently clear and precise that
courts are competent to apply it as a rule of decision. For example, in a
case where arresting officers did not inform arrestees of their right to
consular assistance under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the German Constitutional Court reversed the crim-
inal convictions, holding that Article 36 is directly applicable under
Article 59(2) of the German Basic Law.151 Similarly, where a Dutch
political party invoked freedom of association principles to justify its
policy denying women the right to stand for election, the Netherlands
Supreme Court held that Article 7 of the Convention on Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women required the government to ensure that
all political parties allow women to run for elective offices.152 And in
Eichenlaub v Axa France, a French appellate court held that Article 6.1
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
which protects the right to work, was directly applicable and superseded
Article 75 of the local commerce code.153 Similarly, domestic courts in
Latin America have often held that treaties involving human rights or
humanitarian law are directly applicable.154
Courts in the United States, by contrast, generally do not apply human
rights treaties directly because the federal political branches have consist-
ently inserted declarations in the instruments of ratification for human
150 Courts and commentators sometimes use the term ‘self-executing’ as a
synonym for ‘directly applicable’, but that terminology can be misleading
because the term ‘self-executing’ is also used to mean that the treaty has
domestic legal force. To avoid confusion, we distinguish between two different
questions: (1) whether a treaty has the force of law in the domestic legal system,
and (2) whether the treaty can be applied directly by the courts as a rule of
decision.
151 German Consular Notification Case, F v T (n 139).
152 Netherlands, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations v Stichting
Proefprocessenfonds Clara Wichmann [2010] LJN: BK4549, ILDC 1632
(Supreme Court, Netherlands).
153 Appeal judgment [2008] Case No 05-40876, ILDC 2139 (Social Division,
France).
154 See, e.g. Aliendre v Mendoza [2006] No 84, ILDC 1522 (Civil Court of
Appeal, Paraguay) (appellate court declared property transfer void because it
violated Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which
ranks above domestic law in Paraguay); Shining Path Case, Peru v Reinoso
[2006] No 560-03, ILDC 670 (National Criminal Court, Peru) (holding that
domestic criminal prosecution did not contravene the principle of legality
because defendants had violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
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rights treaties specifying that the treaties are not self-executing.155 The
correct interpretation of such ‘NSE declarations’ is contested.156 Regard-
less, no U.S. court has specifically held that a human rights treaty is
self-executing, and the courts have typically refrained from applying the
treaties directly as rules of decision.157 Some U.S. courts have held that
portions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are self-executing,158 but
judicial authority is divided on this question.159
A judicial decision that a treaty is not directly applicable (or not
self-executing) is a common avoidance technique that courts utilize to
justify application of domestic law without reference to international law.
In contrast, direct application of treaties by domestic courts is an
important technique for harmonizing domestic law with international law.
It bears emphasis, though, that direct application does not guarantee
harmonization because domestic courts sometimes interpret directly
applicable treaties in a way that is not entirely consistent with the
dominant international interpretation.
4.3.2 Direct application of customary international law
Domestic courts in numerous countries apply customary international law
directly as a rule of decision in cases where foreign states and/or foreign
government officials raise a sovereign immunity defense.160 In the United
States, lower federal courts have applied customary international law
155 See David Sloss, ‘The Domestication of International Human Rights:
Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 24 Yale
Journal of International Law 129, 138–44.
156 See David L. Sloss, The Death of Treaty Supremacy: An Invisible
Constitutional Change (Oxford University Press 2016) 306–10 (analyzing differ-
ent possible interpretations of NSE declarations).
157 See, e.g. Renkel v United States, 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the Convention Against Torture is not self-executing because the
political branches included an NSE declaration in the US instrument of ratifica-
tion). But see Freedom to Travel Campaign v Newcomb 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.
1996) (rejecting an ICCPR claim on the merits, without discussing the NSE
declaration).
158 See, e.g. United States v Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553–4 (ED Va.
2002) (holding that portions of the Prisoner of War Convention are self-
executing); United States v Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (SD Fla. 1992)
(same).
159 See, e.g. Al-Bihani v Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 20 (DC Cir. 2010) (stating that
‘the 1949 Geneva Conventions are not self-executing treaties and thus are not
domestic US law’).
160 See Jones v United Kingdom App no 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR,
2014) 116–49 (providing an excellent survey of the law of sovereign immunity in
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directly as a rule of decision in numerous cases under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) where foreign plaintiffs alleged human rights violations by
foreign government officials.161 However, U.S. Supreme Court decisions
in 2004 and 2013 imposed significant constraints on plaintiffs who seek
to raise similar claims in the future.162
Domestic courts rarely apply customary international law directly as a
rule of decision to resolve claims by private plaintiffs against domestic
government actors. The most notable line of cases is a set of decisions by
the Israeli Supreme Court involving the Occupied Territories.163 In Israel,
courts have the authority to apply customary international law directly as
a rule of decision where there is no controlling statute.164 For almost 50
years, Israeli military authorities have governed the Occupied Territories
by promulgating military orders. Israel’s Supreme Court was initially
reluctant to review the legality of such orders, but the Court held in the
Beth El case165 that the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Regarding the Laws
and Customs of War on Land is part of customary international law, and
is therefore directly applicable by the judiciary in cases involving the
Occupied Territories. Since that time, Israel’s Supreme Court has applied
customary IHL directly to decide dozens, if not hundreds, of cases
arising from the ongoing military occupation.166
4.4 Summary
The preceding analysis of domestic courts’ engagement with vertical
international rules supports two main conclusions. First, domestic courts
in states subject to the jurisdiction of a regional human rights tribunal
that has authority to issue legally binding judgments are more likely to
view vertical rules as ‘legal’ (and apply harmonization techniques), and
less likely to view vertical rules as ‘political’ (and apply avoidance
techniques), than their counterparts in states that are not subject to the
jurisdiction of any such tribunal. Interestingly, the fact that states are
the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Italy, Greece, Poland, France
and Slovenia).
161 See generally Beth Stephens and others, International Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts (2nd edn, Irvington-on-Hudson 2008).
162 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co [2013] 133 S. Ct. 1659; Sosa v
Alvarez-Machain [2004] 542 US 692.
163 See Kretzmer (n 114) 305–9.
164 See ibid 278–9.
165 Ayub v Minister of Defence [1978] HCJ 606/78, 33 (2) PD 113 (Supreme
Court of Israel).
166 See Kretzmer (n 114) 305–25.
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subject to supranational jurisdiction under a regional treaty may make
their courts less inclined to view vertical rules in global treaties as
political, even when those global treaties do not provide for supranational
judicial review. Second, domestic courts in states whose national consti-
tutions were promulgated or substantially amended after adoption of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are more likely to
apply harmonization techniques (treating vertical rules as ‘legal’), and
less likely to apply avoidance techniques (treating vertical rules as
‘political’), than their counterparts in states with older national constitu-
tions. For human rights norms, in particular, the tendency to view such
norms as legal, not political, is especially true for states whose post-1948
constitutions incorporate human rights norms embodied in the UDHR
and/or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 1 in this volume suggests that the relationship between politics
and international law varies across stages of governance and governance
systems. It notes that ‘different systems of governance are demarcated by
their subject matter, their scope, or both.’ This chapter has shown that the
role of domestic courts in applying international law depends heavily on
the subject matter of the international legal rule at issue – in particular,
whether the rule is horizontal, transnational or vertical.
Domestic courts typically view horizontal rules as ‘political,’ not
‘legal’. Accordingly, domestic courts rarely apply horizontal rules. Rules
governing the jurisdictional immunities of states are the most notable
exception. Domestic courts routinely apply immunity rules because they
are seen as legal, despite the fact that they regulate horizontal relation-
ships between states. Patterns of judicial enforcement and non-
enforcement of horizontal rules do not differ substantially between
dualist states and hybrid monist states.
In contrast, domestic courts typically view transnational rules as legal,
not political. Accordingly, courts in both dualist states and hybrid monist
states routinely apply transnational rules to help resolve cross-border
disputes between private parties. Although many transnational rules were
part of customary international law in the nineteenth century, most of the
key rules have since been codified in treaties. The political branches play
an important role in incorporating transnational treaties into the domestic
legal order – either by means of legislative incorporation, or by means of
legislative approval for treaty ratification (in hybrid monist states).
However, once the treaty is incorporated, the political branches are
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largely disengaged, and domestic courts have primary responsibility for
treaty implementation.
Application of vertical rules by domestic courts straddles the boundary
between legal and political. If courts view a particular issue as political,
they are likely to employ one of several avoidance techniques, leaving the
issue to be resolved by politics. However, if courts view an issue as legal,
they are likely to employ one of several harmonization techniques in an
effort to harmonize domestic law with the relevant international legal
rule. Several factors influence the decision between harmonization and
avoidance in any particular case. Here, the distinction between dualist
and hybrid monist states has little influence over the choice between
harmonization and avoidance, but it does influence the particular type of
harmonization or avoidance technique that courts utilize.
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